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Introduction 
, 
In this essay I critically examine the views of Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. 
on the euthanasia of defective infants. Engelhardt offers two 
approaches to the problem, which he presents as complementary. I 
will argue that not only are the two approaches not complementary, 
they are even inconsistent with each other. 
Further, I will compare Engelhardt's views on the euthanasia of 
defective newborns with those he expresses elsewhere on the issue of 
abOl;tion. I intend to argue that the positions he takes in the latter 
essay are not entirely consistent with those he takes in the former, and 
that both are dubious. 
In his essay, "Ethical Issues in Aiding the Death of Young Chil-
dren ," H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. attempts to clarify the issue of 
euthanasia involving defective infants.! Engelhardt argues that some 
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sort of euthanasia is permissible, and in some cases possibly manda-
tory, as a result of the following considerations. First, it is not clear 
that even normal small children are persons in the sense that adults are 
persons. Adults "belong" to themselves in the sense that they are 
"rational and free and therefore responsible for their actions." 2 
Young children, on the other hand, are neither self-possessed nor 
responsible. While adults exist in and for themselves as self-directive 
and self-conscious beings, young children exist for their families and 
those who love them. Young children cannot in any sense be respon-
sible for themselves, so if being a person is to be a bearer of rights and 
duties, young children are not persons in a strict sense.3 Small chil-
dren have no self-defined identity. They are, rather, defined by their 
social role - for example, mother-child, family-child. They live as 
persons in and through the care of those who are responsible for them 
until they can develop to the point where they can define their own 
role in society. 
Though newborn infants are not persons in a strict sense, they are 
valued highly because they have the potential to become persons in 
the strict sense. The rights and duties of the child are held "in trust" 
by others for a future time when they become "full-fledged 
persons." 4 Defective newborns constitute a problematic case because 
not only are they not persons in a strict sense, but also because their 
likelihood for living a fully developed human life is very uncertain. 
Because of the remoteness of defective infants from full-fledged 
personhood, Engelhardt claims that it is permissible to euthanize a 
defective newborn in these cases where the prospects for a decent life 
are small and the prospective cost to the family in terms of money and 
anxiety is high.5 He claims that the decisions on these matters prop-
erly lie in the hands of the parents because "it is primarily in terms of 
the family that children exist and develop - until children become 
persons strictly, they are persons in virtue of their social roles." 6 As a 
precaution, Engelhardt stipulates that society has a right to intervene 
and protect children whenever caring for them does not constitute a 
severe burden and when it is likely the child could be brought up to 
enjoy a good quality of life. 7 
It could be questioned, however, whether or not Engelhardt has 
provided sufficient protection for the interests of severely defective 
newborns. If they are truly defective, and their treatment is indeed a 
burden to the parents, the decision would be left entirely to the 
parents. Shouldn't there be some procedure whereby some representa-
tive of society's interest in the protection of life can intervene in case 
the parents' decision is questionable? On this issue, Engelhardt stipu-
lates that 
As long as parents do not unjustifiably neglect the humans in these roles so 
that the value and purpose of that role (that is, child) stands to be eroded 
(thus endangering other children), society need not intervene. 
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and also that 
Society must value mother-child and family-child relationships and should 
intervene only in cases where 1) neglect is unreasonable and thereby would 
undermine respect and care for children, or 2) where societal intervention 
would prevent children from suffering unnecessary pain. 8 
Engelhardt's reference to the possibility of "unreasonable neglect" is 
revealing. This suggests that neglect could at times be "reasonable." It 
is likely, however, that neglect is by definition unreasonable. (For this 
point as well as many others, I am indebted to my colleague, Prof. 
John Donnelly, I would also like to thank my colleague, Prof. 
Dennis Rohatyn, for many useful comments.) Engelhardt might reply 
that this dispute is merely terminological, that he is simply referring to 
the nontreatment of defective infants. It is not clear that the difficulty 
can be resolved so easily, however. Generally, nontreatment of an ill 
patient is based on the grounds that it is in the patient's own interest 
to withhold treatment. Since that appears to be untrue in the cases 
with which Engelhardt is concerned, it remains unclear how failure to 
administer treatment can be rationalized. 
Possibility of Abuse 
Engelhardt's remarks concerning the possible abuse of defective 
infants are troublesome in other respects as well. By linking societal 
intervention to the erosion of respect for other children, Engelhardt 
may be setting the stage for at least sporadic instances of abuse. If the 
abuse of defective infants is sufficiently infrequent so as not to lead to 
an erosion of respect for other children, such abuse on Engelhardt's 
analysis may be not so much unfortunate, though unavoidable, as it is 
permissible. Further, it is not at all clear that the mistreatment or 
automatic euthanasia of defective infants would undermine respect 
for children in general; only similarly defective children would be 
endangered by the spread of a practice that Engelhardt advocates. It 
will be recalled that normal children have rights in virtue of the fact 
that they possess what the defective child lacks, namely the potential 
to develop into a person in the "strict" sense. In Engelhardt's schema, 
normal children are valued in terms of their potential to be persons in 
the "strict" sense and hence, once this fact is emphasized, the auto-
matic euthanasia of less significant entities - severe'ly defective 
infants - cannot be expected to erode that role. Indeed, Engelhardt's 
analysis is paradoxical in that the more morally questionable the 
decision is to allow an ihfant to die, the less likely it is to erode the 
safety of normal children. Assuming that the majority of persons 
would find that allowing, for instance, that the immediate euthanasia 
of mongoloid newborns is abhorrent, this would help guarantee that 
such actions are permissible if done only by the parents of mongoloid 
infants. This is because the majority would not act this way and would 
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be horrified by the practice. Such an attitude on the part of parents of 
normal children would, therefore, ensure the safety of normal chil-
dren. 
It is also unclear whether the second type of situation, when inter-
vention is permissible, actually protects the defective infant. First, 
intervening only to prevent unnecessary pain would seem, in this con-
text, to allow intervention most often to cause death, rarely to 
prevent it. What constitutes unnecessary suffering, moreover, is at 
least in part determined by the status of the infant. If the defective 
infant does not possess the feature that entitles normal children to 
rights, almost any suffering could be considered "unnecessary." If, 
however, a child is normal or has a reasonable chance of undergoing 
normal development, he at once has rights and a promising future, and 
any suffering which present treatment causes would have to be con-
sidered "necessary," i.e., justifiable. It could be, therefore, that Engel-
hardt's reference to preventing "unnecessary" pain in effect merely 
reflects the original ontological distinction between normal and defec-
tive infants. As such, it is not clear how it could be expected to 
operate successfully to hinder possible abuses of defective infants 
inspired by that distinction. 
Thus Engelhardt's limiting principles do little to defeat the parental 
abuse allowed by his analysis of defective infants. Moreover, Engel-
hardt's analysis is questionable in that defective infants need not be 
dependent upon their parents for financial and emotional support. 
There are many organizations affiliated with institutions such as the 
Catholic Church which routinely take custody of defective infants. 
Thus the number of possible persons and groups from which the 
infant could receive support is significantly greater than Engelhardt 
allows. The parents of defective infants should only be allowed to 
decide their children's fate if no other agency or person is able to 
tender support to the children. The number of infants vyho cannot be 
saved in this manner would then presumably be reduced, if not 
eliminated. 
Engelhardt's analysis can also be questioned in light of an earlier 
discussion of abortion. In his article, "The Ontology of Abortion," 
Engelhardt claims that the potentiality of the fetus to become a full-
fledged person is not sufficient to confer on it any significant rights. 9 
Certainly not until it has reached the stage of viability can it be 
considered to have a right to life.1o Engelhardt allows that if a strin-
gent definition of a " person" is accepted, there would be prima facie 
reasons for permitting not only the abortion of viable fetuses, but 
infanticide as well. This result need not obtain, according to Engel-
hardt, for although in early infancy a human person is not actually 
present, nonetheless 
the child is appreciated socially as a n individual to whom o ne has actual 
- not potential - obligations in a fashion quite d ifferent from the fe tus in 
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the mother-fetus relationship. The newborn infant, unlike the fetus, can 
elicit a series of regular responses and activities from rational humans even 
though the infant is not itself rational. Even within primitive social con-
texts, its crying appears as a demand for food, etc., and initiates a series of 
activities directed to the infant as if it were a person. 11 
It should first be noted that in this essay, Engelhardt argues that the 
potential to be a person in the "strict" sense is not morally significant. 
But if not, then the feature which distinguishes a defective from a 
normal infant in Engelhardt's later essay must be suspect. It would 
seem that either the distinction in terms of rights between normal and 
defective infants would have to be abandoned, or the contention that 
the potential of the fetus to become a person in the " strict" sense is 
morally significant. 
Engelhardt's Reasoning 
The reason Engelhardt advances for claiming that infanticide iS j 
impermissible deserves close scrutiny. Newborns and viable fetuses, 
though not rational, possess the property of being appreciated as 
beings whose needs or demands should presumably be honored. If so, 
then while abortion of nonviable fetuses may be permissible, infanti-
cide, like abortion of possibly viable fetuses, is not. Unfortunately, if 
despite being in a nonrational state, the ability to be perceived as 
having needs is sufficient for ensuring a right to life, then surely 
defective infants would have at least as much claim to that right as 
normal infants. Defective infants are often even more dependent upon 
others than normal infants. All that seems to be needed is that some 
rational others perceive the expression of·a need as a demand worthy 
of being honored. Indeed it seems that the criteria for ascribing rights 
Engelhardt introduces in this earlier essay are quite disparate from 
those proferred in the later essay. The criteria introduced in the earlier 
essay imply that entities which are not persons in the "strict" sense 
may nonetheless have rights if rational others can see them as persons. 
In the later essay, defective infants simply do not have rights because 
they are neither persons in the strict sense nor have the potential to 
become such. If, in accordance with the earlier criteria, defective 
infants were considered by a majority of persons to be persons, they 
would presumably possess a right to life. If so, then abuse of them 
would seem to be impermissible even if it did not lead to the abuse of 
other children, just as isolated abuse of normal children would be 
impermissible. 
Engelhardt claims that the mother-fetus relationship is primarily 
biological and occurs automatically, without active involvement of the 
mother. The mother-child relationship is, however, active and 
explicitly social. The difference lies 
in the social schema, the well developed social role "child" in which the 
infant can be acted upon as if it were a person and in which it acts back. 12 
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In claiming that the infant "acts back" presumably "as if it were a 
person," Engelhardt must be speaking metaphorically. He has pre-
viously stated that they are not strictly persons but merely have the 
potential for becoming such. Thus they do not have the capacity for 
intentional action that normal adults possess. Infants, both defective 
and normal, would then seem to merely react to stimuli and to 
instinctively express their needs. Neither the healthy infant nor the 
defective one would seem to "act" (back) in the sense of intentional 
action. 13 What then could be the possible basis for seeing the infant as 
if it were a person who can act and be acted upon? Presumably Engel-
hardt holds that within the social context of medicine it is true that 
infants are treated as if they were persons even though their continued 
healthy existence is not guaranteed. Fetal development on the other 
hand is automatic, and the fetus cannot be seen as a separate patient. 
The above line of argument was rendered permanently irrelevant, 
however, almost before Engelhardt's essay appeared. With techniques 
such as ultrasound, amniocentesis, etc., the condition of the fetus as a 
separate patient can be ascertained. Moreover, as the following actual 
case shows, the fetus can be the object of therapy in utero. Recently, 
a young fetus was diagnosed as suffering from hydronephrosis, a 
disorder of the urinary tract which can lead to kidney destruction. 14 
Physicians waited until the seventh month of fetal development and 
then took steps to irrigate the fetal bladder, which abated the condi-
tion until the infant could be operated on after birth. As the physi-
cians involved in the case put it, "We can now treat the fetus as a 
patient." Indeed, the National Commission for the Protection of the 
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research states that the 
fetus is a human subject who is deserving of care and respect. Their 
guidelines regarding therapeutic research directed toward the fetus 
include the following stipulation in such research: 
The fetal su bject is selected on the basis of its health condition, benefits and 
risks accrue to that fetus, and proxy consent is directed toward that 
subject's own welfare. Hence, with adequate review to assess scientific 
merit, prior research, the balance of risks and benefits, and the su fficiency 
of the consent process, such research conforms with all relevant principles 
and is both ethically acceptable and laudable . . .. 15 
Thus the concept of the fetus as a patient has been an integral part of 
medical policy since at least 1975. 
On Engelhardt's analysis, it seems that fetuses can qualify as 
patients since they can be 1) the subject of therapy and 2) legitimately 
seen as persons. One distinction (according to Engelhardt) between 
newborns and fetuses is that the development of the fetus is automatic 
and requires no intervention by others. It seems, however, that only 
the development of the normal fetus will be automatic, i.e., such that 
it does not call for medical intervention. Contrast the gestating defec· 
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tive infant who calls for the application of therapeutic techniques, as 
in the example cited. Here again, it would seem that on Engelhardt's 
criteria the defective human would have more claim to rights than 
could the normal human. But surely this is odd, at least on Engel-
hardt's professed terms. 
II 
In any case, Engelhardt discusses a second important aspect of the 
euthanasia of defective infants. Suppose the defective infant has a 
right not to have its life prolonged. 16 It could be that to such an 
individual its continued existence is an evil, not a good. The legal 
embodiment of this (moral) concept is the proposed legal notion of 
"wrongful life." Engelhardt notes that a number of suits have been 
initiated in the United States and other countries claiming that life or 
existence is a tort or injury to the living person. The concept of 
wrongful life presupposes that nonexistence is preferable to life and 
that arriving at such judgments is reasonable in specific cases. Engel-
hardt claims that the concept of tort for wrongful life is transferable, 
in part, to the 
... painfully compromised existence of children who can only have their 
life prolonged for a short, painful, and marginal existence. The concept 
suggests that allowing life to be prolonged under such circumstances would 
itself be an injury to the person whose painful and severely compromised 
existence would be made to continue .... 17 
Engelhardt argues that there may be a duty not to prolong life when-
ever it can be determined to have a substantial negative value for the 
person involved. 18 
Engelhardt explicates these two approaches to the problem of 
defective newborns as if they were complementary or at least com-
patible. It seems, however, that the two approaches are not only not 
complementary, but indeed inconsistent. To the extent that one 
approach to the problem is adopted, the other must be abandoned. It 
will be recalled that the reason Engelhardt adduces for claiming that 
the euthanasia of defective newborns should be left to the parents is 
that they (newborns) have no "self-defining" identity of their own. 
Small children have only a social identity until they develop the char-
acteristics of autonomy, and hence acquire rights and responsibilities. 
Until that time, the rights of normal infants are held in trust. Respect 
for the time when the infant will attain the status of a normal adult is 
what enjoins us to value infants highly. The case is different for defec-
tive newborns. They possess merely a social identity, i.e., that of 
"child." Moreover, their social identity must include the fact that they 
are a defective token of that type. They do not possess the character-
istic which Engelhardt claims commands our moral deference - the 
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potential to develop into a normal adult, who is a person in the 
"strict" sense. This being the case, the parents, whom the small child 
"lives through" and who give it sustenance, can determine its fate as it 
apparently has no rights of its own. Unfortunately, if defective new-
borns only possess an identity through their social role and do not 
command respect in virtue of their potential to develop into a person 
in the "strict" sense, it is not clear how their interest could be repre-
sented in a civil injury suit. In a tort, reference is made to the damage 
to interests of "persons." The archetypical participant in such 
litigation is a person in "strict" sense. However, the interests of incom-
petent persons are protected in civil matters by a legal principle 
known as the "principle of substituted judgment" which allows for 
proxy consent on behalf of the incompetent. An attempt is made to 
"don the mantle of the incompetent" and choose what he or she 
would want if he or she were competent.19 In this way the partic-
ularly human characteristic of rational choice is extended to the 
incompetent, and respect for the inherent human dignity of the 
incompetent is sustained. 
Allusion to Wrongful Life Suits 
To make the allusion to suits for wrongful life (or the wrong of 
continued existence) on behalf of the defective infant is to imply that 
the infant has the rights of other citizens. If, however, the application 
of civil law to cases involving defective newborns presupposes that the 
victim has the status of a person, difficulties arise with regard to 
Engelhardt's first approach to the problem. To leave the decision to 
the parents, and to allow financial and emotional burdens to be deter-
mining factors does not accord well with the legal concept that the 
interests of a defective newborn are on a par with those of other 
individuals who are persons in a strict sense. If Engelhardt's first 
approach is adopted, and the legal fact that incompetents have stand-
ing equal to that of normal persons is recognized, the following absurd 
result is implied: anytime any person whose existence depends upon 
others becomes an emotional or financial burden, he can be killed or 
allowed to die. This result would obtain because leaving the decision 
to aid the death of defective infants up to the parents was based in 
large part upon the fact that the infants have no rights of their own; 
they live only through their parents. Once these infants are presumed 
to have the status of other persons, the parental sovereignty Engel-
hardt grants on the first approach appears excessive. 
If, on the other hand, Engelhardt's first approach is abandoned in 
light of these considerations, treatment of defective newborns will, in 
some cases, take a different course. If the newborn is seen as having 
the same basic right to life as normal adult persons, emphasis will be 
May, 1983 179 
placed upon what is in its best interests, not someone else's. Hence, 
factors such as parental anguish and financial burden would corres-
pondingly diminish in importance. Otherwise, we are forced to 
condone the possibility that the life of the infant may be sacrificed for 
the benefit of others.20 If we acknowledge the defective newborn's 
interests as being as legitimate as the interests of other persons, we can 
then justify making the effort to secure conditions favorable to their 
existence even under physically, emotionally, or economically adverse 
circumstances. All that is required is that the infant be delivered from 
incessant pain; it need not be relieved of pain altogether. After all, no 
persons have an existence entirely free of pain.21 Indeed, some other-
wise normal individuals suffer from constant or chronic pain and yet 
we do not therefore contend that they have less of a right to live. The 
fact that the defective may never possess the characteristics which 
Engelhardt claims entitle it to personhood in the "strict" sense is 
insignificant once we adopt the legal viewpoint. For as long as a 
reasonable lifeplan can be realized for the incompetent, that is all that 
is needed. By means of the principle of substituted judgment, the 
probable wishes of the incompetent can be ascertained. These prefer-
ences necessarily differ from those of other persons, but this does not 
imply either that their satisfaction is not important to the incompe-
tent or that they are less worthy of being satisfied. 
On the other hand, if Engelhardt's first approach is adopted, defec-
tive infants are neither persons in the "strict" sense nor do they have 
the characteristic which would confer such status on them. Hence, it is 
difficult to see how they could be represented in civil litigation or, for 
that matter, have any of their rights violated by continued existence. 
As a cop.sequence, no strong moral duty could be ascribed to the 
physician to terminate or not treat a defective infant. This is for two 
reasons: 1) only persons are due serious moral consideration, and 
2) physicians qua physicians are charged with the medical treatment 
of persons. Therefore, Engelhardt's second approach is simply 
inapplicable. Engelhardt's analysis puts the defective infant in a 
catch-22 situation. For the purpose of allowing those to whom it is a 
burden to decide whether to euthanize it, it has no serious rights of its 
own. For the purpose of deciding what is best for the infant, it has the 
rights of a person insofar as it can, through proxy consent, demand its 
own death. 
The discussion in this section points inescapably to the conclusion 
that extreme caution is needed in deciding the issue of whether to 
treat defective infants. There is the danger of misguidedly elevating 
their status in order to claim that the infant has a right to die. When 
this is done, it becomes imperative to realize that by parity of reason-
ing the infant has the same right to life as any normal adult. In that 
case, it seems that Engelhardt has misguidedly argued for an effect 
opposite to that for which he argued in his first approach. 
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